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WHY CHILDREN’S SUGGESTIBILITY
REMAINS A SERIOUS CONCERN
AMYE R. WARREN* AND DOROTHY F. MARSIL**
I
INTRODUCTION
After more than two decades of continuous contemporary research on the
child as a witness in legal proceedings, a great deal is known about children’s
eyewitness memory and suggestibility.  Excellent reviews of this research are
available,1 and their summaries and conclusions will not be reiterated here.  In-
stead, this article will focus on six areas representing some of the most intracta-
ble problems that will require further attention from scientists and practitioners
alike.  This list of issues is selective and somewhat idiosyncratic, but should
serve to illustrate why the current understanding of children’s suggestibility is
far from complete.  Research on each issue will be highlighted, concentrating
primarily on studies published or presented in the past ten years.
II
SIX REMAINING ISSUES
A. Suggestibility is Not Limited to Preschool Children
In the past ten years, research on children’s capacities as witnesses has fo-
cused heavily on preschoolers,2 who are disproportionately susceptible to sug-
gestion.3  The focus on preschoolers was based on both applied and theoretical
grounds.  For example, investigations in the McMartin Preschool case4 and State
v. Michaels5 featured particularly problematic interviews with large numbers of
very young children in day-care settings.  Knowledge of cognitive development
principles led child witness researchers to predict that preschoolers’ relative
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1. Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review
and Synthesis, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993).
2. The term “preschooler” refers to children between the ages of three and five.
3. Maggie Bruck & Stephen J. Ceci, The Suggestibility of Children’s Memory, 50 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 419 (1999).
4. Satz v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
5. 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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cognitive limitations could lead to greater susceptibility to suggestive influences
and, in turn, to a variety of problems for their interviewers.  For example,
Nancy Perry and her colleagues demonstrated that preschoolers have difficulty
determining whether they really understand complex questions and frequently
inaccurately answer questions that they do not understand.6
Although the research attention devoted to preschoolers was certainly war-
ranted, it has led to a relative neglect of the equally important population of
older children.  This trend, however, appears to be changing.  In recent studies,
researchers are increasingly including older children.7  The findings indicate that
suggestibility generally declines over the school years but that even adolescents
can be significantly more suggestible than adults.8  On the other hand, some
studies demonstrate that, under certain conditions, older children and adults
can be more suggestible than younger children.9  The following sections briefly
review six studies that included children older than preschoolers.
Jennifer Ackil and Maria Zaragoza examined the suggestibility of first grad-
ers, third graders, fifth graders, and college students. 10  The subjects viewed a
brief video and then heard an experimenter read a summary of the video that
included some misleading information.11  Either immediately afterwards or one
week later, participants were given memory tests.12  Evidence of suggestibility
was found for all age groups, but first graders were more susceptible to sugges-
tion than third and fifth graders, who were in turn more susceptible to sugges-
tion than college students.13  Essentially, the same pattern of age differences was
found in the proportion of the suggested items that participants claimed to have
actually seen in the video, as opposed to remembering from the summary.14
Julie Robinson and Pamela Briggs also showed a film to their participants,
who were four- to five-year-olds, eight- to nine-year-olds, and adults. 15  They
6. Nancy Perry et al., When Lawyers Question Children: Is Justice Served?, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 609, 621-25 (1995).
7. Jennifer K. Ackil & Maria S. Zaragoza, Developmental Differences in Eyewitness Suggestibility
and Memory for Source, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 62 (1995); William Cassel et al., De-
velopmental Patterns of Eyewitness Responses to Repeated and Increasingly Suggestive Questions, 61 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 116 (1996); Pamela Coxon & Tim Valentine, The Effects of the Age
of Eyewitness on the Accuracy and Suggestibility of their Testimony, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
415 (1997); Marc A. Lindberg et al., Eyewitness Testimony for Physical Abuse as Function of Personal
Experience, Development, and Focus of Study, 21 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 555 (2000)
[hereinafter Lindberg, Eyewitness]; Marc Lindberg, An Interactive Approach to Assessing the Suggesti-
bility and Testimony of Eyewitnesses, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS 47,
49-52 (John Doris ed., 1991) [hereinafter Lindberg, Interactive]; Julie Robinson & Pamela Briggs, Age
Trends in Eyewitness Suggestibility and Compliance, 3 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 187 (1997).
8. Ackil & Zaragoza, supra note 7, at 74-75; Robinson & Briggs, supra note 7, at 196-98; Cassel et
al., supra note 7, at 123-24; Lindberg, Eyewitness, supra note 7, at 567-72; Lindberg, Interactive, supra
note 7, at 50-54.
9. Lindberg, Interactive, supra note 7, at 50-54.
10. Ackil & Zaragoza, supra note 7, at 62.
11. Id. at 63.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 67-72.
14. Id. at 72-74.
15. Robinson & Briggs, supra note 7, at 191-92.
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then asked a series of questions, some of which were misleading.16  A day later,
they asked another set of questions.17  In terms of correct answers to misleading
questions, the youngest children’s performance was poorer than that of eight- to
nine-year-olds and adults.  The latter two groups, however, did not significantly
differ.18  In contrast, when suggested answers to misleading questions were ex-
amined separately, the study showed that both age groups of children were
more suggestible than adults, but that the children did not differ from one an-
other.19
In a similar study, Pamela Coxon and Tim Valentine examined the relative
suggestibility of seven- to nine-year-olds, young adults, and elderly adults. 20
Participants viewed a film and later answered two sets of questions, some of
which were misleading.21  Children were significantly more likely to be misled
than were the two groups of adults.  Again, the two adult groups did not differ
from one another.22
William Cassel, Claudia Roebers, and David Bjorkland showed a film about
a bicycle theft to kindergartners, second graders, fourth graders, and adults and
then asked some of them misleading questions a week later. 23  Kindergartners
were more susceptible to suggestion than all older age groups, who did not sig-
nificantly differ from one another,24 except when the suggestions concerned in-
formation that was central25 to the premise of the entire event.26  This suggests
that the importance of the information sought is predictive of a child’s ability to
recall it and to resist misleading information about it.  When the information is
important, younger children may be more likely to recall it, and therefore their
recall and ability to resist misleading questions may be equal to that of older
children and even adults.
Marc Lindberg, John Keiffer, and Stuart Thomas compared the suggestibil-
ity of nine-year-olds, thirteen-year-olds, and seventeen-year-olds. 27  All children
watched a videotape that included an apparent act of physical abuse by a
mother against her son.28  Later they were given two memory tests about the
16. Misleading questions are those that incorporate or suggest inaccurate information that may
lead to incorrect answers.  For example, if a man in the film had a mustache but no beard, a misleading
question might ask, “What color was the man’s beard?”  Id. at 192.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 193.
19. Id. at 194-96.
20. Coxon & Valentine, supra note 7, at 420-21.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 425.
23. Cassel et al., supra note 7, at 121-22.
24. Id. at 123-27.
25. For example, a question concerning a central detail might be whether the thief asked permis-
sion to take the bike, whereas a question concerning a peripheral detail might ask about the color of a
bystander’s shirt.
26. Id. at 128.
27. Lindberg, Eyewitness, supra note 7, at 561.
28. Id.
WARREN_FMT.DOC 11/13/01  4:01 PM
130 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
film, the first of which included misleading questions.29  The nine-year-olds were
significantly more suggestible than were the thirteen- and seventeen-year-olds
about central details of the film, including how many times the mother hit the
boy and how much blood came from his nose.30  Additionally, the youngest chil-
dren were much more likely than the older two groups to fabricate responses to
nonleading questions for which they could not recall the answers.31  Even the
seventeen-year-olds, however, were suggestible, and a third of them confabu-
lated answers.32
Finally, another study by Marc Lindberg revealed circumstances in which
older children and adults can be more suggestible than younger children. 33  In
this study, third graders, sixth graders, and college students were tested on their
memories for a film about students taking a test.34  Prior to the film, some of the
participants were misled to believe that the students would cheat.35  Half of the
participants were misled about cheating through questions that followed the
film.36  Although in general the younger children were more suggestible than the
older children and college students, the opposite finding occurred for one ques-
tion involving a student in the film who had asked about the time of day.37  Ap-
parently the older children and college students, who had more extensive
knowledge of cheating, assumed that asking about the time of day was a sophis-
ticated cheating strategy, when in fact it was an innocent question.38
Despite the progress in understanding suggestibility over the entire range of
childhood, research has not yet produced equivalent levels of knowledge about
older children, preschoolers, and adults.  Increasing age typically is associated
with increased resistance to suggestion and increased strength of memory.39  On
the other hand, increasing age also brings with it changes that can weaken the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony, such as greater skill in deception.40  In some
studies, suggestibility appears to decrease in a gradual linear fashion with in-
creasing age, whereas in other studies, older children appear to have reached
the asymptote, displaying adult levels of suggestibility.41  More research is neces-
sary to determine the conditions under which and the age at which children
show equivalent suggestibility to adults.  Moreover, the level of ecological va-
29. Id. at 562.
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id. at 567.
32. Id. at 567-70.
33. Lindberg, Interactive, supra note 7, at 54.
34. Id. at 49.
35. Id. at 49-50.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Id. at 52-53.
39. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 1, at 421.
40. Id. at 426-27.
41. Id. at 431-34.
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lidity42 in research with older children requires improvement in that most such
studies have not used participatory events.  Finding events that work equally
well across a wide age range is difficult, but it is a goal we should strive for in fu-
ture research.
B. Suggestiveness is Not Limited to Leading Questions
The majority of studies on children’s suggestibility has focused on children’s
responses to leading and misleading questions.  A vast literature now exists on
different types of questions and the effects that they appear to have on the ac-
curacy and completeness of children’s testimony.43  Suggestion, however, takes
on many different forms.44  As with the other topics reviewed, the discussion
that follows will be limited to a few recent studies that illustrate some of these
lesser-studied forms of suggestion.
Sena Garven and her colleagues recently published two studies on the ef-
fects of potentially suggestive techniques used by interviewers in the McMartin
Preschool case.45  In their first study, three- to six-year-olds were interviewed
about a prior event with either suggestive questions only or a package of inap-
propriate interview techniques, including suggestive questions and three addi-
tional factors they termed social influence, reinforcement, and invitations to
speculate. 46  Social influence involved giving information about the event that
other children (“big kids”) had supposedly already provided.47  Reinforcement
involved praising the children’s memory and intelligence if they answered “yes”
to leading and misleading questions, or exhorting them to try harder or ex-
pressing mild disapproval if they answered “no.”48  Children were invited to
speculate by being asked to think hard and then being asked a leading or mis-
leading question beginning with: “Do you think maybe that X happened?”49
Children in this package condition were significantly more likely to answer
misleading questions with the suggested information than were children only
asked suggestive questions, and this was equally true across the age range.50
42. Ecological validity refers to the extent to which a study is representative of the “real-world”
situation to which it was designed to apply.  Given that the crime of child abuse is the event to which
most studies of children’s suggestibility attempt to relate, then events in which children are interactive
participants, such as playing a game or undergoing a physical examination, rather than mere bystand-
ers, such as watching a videotaped crime, are likely to be more valid.
43. See generally DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998).
44. For a comprehensive review, see Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Suggestibility of Children’s Testi-
mony, in FALSE-MEMORY CREATION IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS 169 (David Bjorkland ed., 2000).
45. Sena Garven et al., More than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED  PSYCHOL. 347, 350-54 (1998) [hereinafter Garven, Sugges-
tion]; Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on Children’s Mun-
dane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED  PSYCHOL. 38, 41-45 (2000) [hereinafter Garven, Allegations].
46. Garven, Suggestion, supra note 45, at 350.
47. Id. at 351.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 352.
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Most of the misleading suggestions implied wrongdoing on the part of a male
experimenter.51  Children given the whole package of suggestive techniques
made false allegations over three times more often than did children only asked
suggestive questions.52
In their second study, Garven and her colleagues focused on the effects of
reinforcement and the provision of event information supposedly obtained from
other children, called co-witness information, on children’s tendencies to accept
false suggestions regarding actions of a male experimenter that were both mun-
dane, such as tearing a book, and fantastic, such as taking the child on a helicop-
ter ride.53  In this study of five- to seven-year-olds, children who received co-
witness information made more mundane false allegations than did the children
in the control group,54 but did not differ in terms of fantastic false allegations.55
In contrast, reinforcement had a strong impact on children’s answers to both
types of misleading questions.56  Thirty-five percent of children who received
reinforcement made false mundane allegations, compared to thirteen percent
for the controls, and fifty-two percent of the same children made false fantastic
allegations, compared to only five percent for controls.57  In addition, false alle-
gations tended to carry over to a later interview—two to three weeks after-
wards—even when no reinforcement was used at that time.58
Another set of studies has examined the effect of interviewers’ distortions or
misinterpretations of children’s answers.59  For example, in one interview, a two-
year-old child said, “G.A. touched me.” 60  Her interviewer responded, “Jesus
loves me?  Is that what you said?”; the child replied, “Yeah.”61
Kim Roberts and Michael Lamb analyzed a sample of sixty-eight sexual
abuse interviews involving children between the ages of three and fourteen
years, and found 140 instances of interviewer distortions and misinterpreta-
tions.62  Many of these distortions involved the identities of people being dis-
cussed in the interview, and many others involved actions.63  Children actually
51. Id.
52. Fifty-eight percent versus seventeen percent.  Id.
53. Garven, Allegations, supra note 45, at 38-39.
54. Twenty-nine percent versus nineteen percent.  Id. at 42.
55. Id. at 42-43.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 42.
58. Id. at 44-45.
59. Kim Roberts & Michael E. Lamb, Children’s Responses when Interviewers Distort Details
During Investigative Interviews, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 23, 23-31 (1999); Amye R.
Warren et al., “It Sounds Good in Theory, But . . .”: Do Investigative Interviewers Follow Guidelines
Based on Memory Research?, 1 CHILD MALTREATMENT 231, 231-45 (1996) [hereinafter Warren et al.,
Sounds]; Jennifer S. Hunt & Eugene Borgida, Developmental Differences in Witnesses’ Responses to
Modifications, Eliciting Accurate Testimony from Children: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why?, A
Symposium presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
Amye R. Warren & Debra A. Poole, Chairs (April 1999).
60. Warren, Sounds, supra note 59, at 235.
61. Id.
62. Roberts & Lamb, supra note 59, at 23-25.
63. Id. at 29.
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agreed with the distortions one-third of the time, and explicitly corrected or dis-
agreed with only one-third of them.64  In the absence of corrective feedback, the
interviewers continued to use the distorted version of the information during
the remainder of the interviews.65  However, the children later mentioned the
distorted information only rarely, and their tendency to do so was unrelated to
their initial agreement or disagreement.66
In actual interviews, it is impossible to determine whether interviewers’ dis-
tortions are minor or major errors relative to the reality of the original events.67
Furthermore, children may fail to disagree with interviewer distortions because
the interviewers’ interpretations may in fact be correct.68  Therefore, Jennifer
Hunt and Eugene Borgida designed an experiment in which four- to five-year-
olds, nine- to eleven-year-olds, and adults witnessed a videotaped event and
then were later interviewed.69  The interviewers were instructed to distort five of
the answers.  Overall, participants disagreed with only twenty-two percent of
the modifications, and adults were significantly more likely than children to dis-
agree.70  In an unbiased follow-up interview, the younger children—four- to five-
year-olds—were more likely to incorporate prior interviewer distortions into
their answers.71  Interestingly, information contained in interviewer distortions
that were corrected—that is, explicitly disagreed with—was never included in
subsequent reports.72  In other words, when children clearly and confidently re-
called information well enough to disagree with their interviewers, the inter-
viewers’ suggested misinformation was never mentioned in the children’s later
descriptions or answers to questions about events.
Research has only recently begun to examine alternate forms of suggestion,
some of which are explicit and obviously coercive, while others may be subtle
and quite unintentional, such as distortions.  Although much more research on
these types of suggestion is required, it is clear that suggestions may be equally
or even more detrimental to children’s testimonial veracity than leading ques-
tions.  Just as with the research on leading questions, the controversy over these
other suggestive techniques is likely to evolve over time, from whether they
promote false allegations to how often they are used in typical interviews.73
64. Id. at 27-28.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Hunt & Borgida, supra note 59.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of the argument over the prevalence of leading questions in typical interviews,
see Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1004, 1033-37 (1999), and the rebuttal by Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggesti-
bility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 63-70 (2000).
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C. Suggestibility is Not Confined to Formal Interviews
Most of the research on the suggestibility of child witnesses has focused on
fairly explicit suggestions made in the course of formal interviews with children
about prior events.74  This is understandable, given that one can better docu-
ment and control the formal interview process.  Much of children’s exposure to
suggestive influences, however, probably occurs outside the formal interview
setting.75  Suggestions may be made by parents, other adults, or other children
prior to the first formal investigative interview or between repeated forensic or
clinical interviews.76
Such outside suggestive influences have only recently begun to receive re-
search attention.  Debra Poole and Stephen Lindsay designed the innovative
procedure of having parents provide misleading information to their children
prior to two neutral, nonleading interviews.77  Children, ages three to eight
years, participated in an experimental session with Mr. Science, who conducted
some science demonstrations.78  Immediately afterward, they were neutrally in-
terviewed.79  Approximately three months later, parents were sent books to read
to these children at home.80  The books were about a visit to Mr. Science and
described events that had occurred during the child’s own visit, as well as events
that had not occurred.81  Although the children were not told that the events in
the story accurately described their own visits to Mr. Science, they also were not
told that the stories contained false information.82  Within a few days after par-
ents read the stories, and then again after a month-long delay, children were in-
terviewed neutrally, with the interviews progressing from free recall to direct,
yes or no questions about experienced (true) and nonexperienced (false)
events.83  The key findings of this study were that twenty-one percent of the
events reported in free recall three and one-half months after the event, and ten
percent four and one-half months after the event, were false because they had
not been actually experienced.84  The rates of reporting false information in free
recall did not differ by age across this range from three to eight years.85  More
than one-third of the children falsely answered direct questions about nonexpe-
rienced touching after three and one-half months.  By four and one-half
months, older children’s false acquiescence dropped, as it had been at least a
74. Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Children’s Eyewitness Reports after Exposure to Misin-
formation from Parents, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 27 (2001) [hereinafter Poole, Eye-
witness].
75. Id. at 27-28.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 28-29.
78. Id. at 29.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 30.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 30-31.
84. Id. at 33.
85. Id. at 34.
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month since they were exposed to the misinformation, but three- to four-year-
olds’ false acquiescence increased, such that over half of them reported false in-
formation about nonexperienced touching.86  These findings raise concerns
about the potential of false information to carry over into children’s responses
during later nonleading interviews.
Michelle Leichtman and Stephen Ceci took another approach to supplying
preschoolers with misleading information outside of the interview context.87
Prior to a preschool visit by a man called Sam Stone, children were presented
negative stereotypes of him.88  Sam was depicted as clumsy and prone to break-
ing objects.89  Children in this “stereotype only” condition then experienced
Sam’s visit, during which he did not break or harm anything, and were neutrally
questioned once a week for the next four weeks about the visit.90  In a fifth and
final, neutral interview, more than one-third of children responded falsely to a
direct question about Sam Stone’s behavior, such as “Did he rip the book?,” in
a direction consistent with the negative stereotype, despite the fact that these
children had not been asked any misleading questions.91
Similarly, in the Lindberg study described above, prior to viewing a video
depicting a mother hitting her son, grade schoolers and college students were
given one of three descriptions of the video. 92  In one, they were told that the
mother was mean and had been previously arrested for child abuse (“mean
mom”); in the second, they were told that the son’s behavior had been very
problematic at home and school, and that the mother had already tried many
gentle forms of discipline (“bad boy”); and in the third, they were given no bi-
asing information (neutral).93  The form of instructions affected many of the re-
sponses to both suggestive and nonsuggestive questions.94  For example, when
asked how hard the boy deserved to be hit, those in the bad boy condition
thought he should have been hit harder than did those in the neutral condition,
who in turn thought he should be hit harder than did those in the mean mom
condition.95
Even when false information is never presented to children, whether within
or outside of interview questions, false reports may emerge nonetheless.  When
children’s memories become distorted without external influence, it is some-
times termed “autosuggestibility.”96  In one form of autosuggestibility, children
86. Id. at 37-38.
87. Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes and Suggestions on Pre-
schoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 570-71 (1995).
88. Id. at 570-71.
89. Id. at 570.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 572.
92. Lindberg, Eyewitness, supra note 7, at 561.
93. Id. at 562.
94. Id. at 567-68.
95. Id. at 571-73.
96. E.g., Charles J. Brainerd & Valerie F. Reyna, Autosuggestibility in Memory Development, 28
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 65 (1995).
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and adults may distort information to make it more congruent with their prior
knowledge.97  In the Lindberg study, older children and adults were more likely
to answer a nonleading question with false information than were younger chil-
dren. 98  The younger children were not as suggestible because they did not pos-
sess sophisticated, elaborate knowledge of cheating.99  In another example of
autosuggestion due to prior knowledge, Stephen Ceci and his colleagues pre-
sented a tape-recorded story to seven- and ten-year-olds. 100  The stories featured
familiar or unfamiliar television characters; in some versions, the familiar char-
acters were described in ways that clashed with their usual portrayals, such as a
superhero who was too weak to carry a can of paint.101  Children were asked to
rate the characters and their behavior either immediately after the story or
three weeks later.102  When asked immediately, children correctly recalled the
character descriptions and behavior, but three weeks later, children’s ratings
were distorted in the direction of their prior knowledge of the characters’ typi-
cal attributes and behaviors.103  On the other hand, when story characters were
completely unfamiliar, these types of distortions did not occur even after the
delay.104  Therefore, Ceci and colleagues concluded that when information con-
flicts with prior knowledge, prior knowledge over time will distort or perhaps
even supplant that information.105
These results highlight the role of time in the emergence of autosuggestibil-
ity.  Especially after a delay, memories of events may become inaccurate even
without outside interference.106  For example, in a study by Debra Poole and
Lawrence White, four-, six-, and eight-year-old children and adults experienced
an event and were repeatedly neutrally questioned about it one week later and
then again two years later. 107  When examining the total amount of inaccurate
information reported in response to open-ended questions, they found no age
differences after a week—children averaged seven percent inaccurate informa-
tion compared to six percent for the adults.108  After two years, however, chil-
dren were much more likely than adults to report inaccurate information with
error rates of twenty percent versus seven percent, respectively.109  Children’s
inaccuracies ranged from fairly minor, such as incorrect physical descriptions of
97. Id. at 71.
98. See Lindberg, Interactive, supra note 7, at 52.
99. Id.
100. Stephen J. Ceci et al., Children’s Long-Term Memory for Information that is Incongruous with
their Prior Knowledge, 72 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 443, 444-45 (1981).
101. Id. at 445.
102. Id. at 448.
103. Id. at 449.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Two Years Later: Effects of Question Repetition and
Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 844, 845-49 (1993) [hereinafter Poole, Two Years Later].
107. Id. at 846.
108. Id. at 848.
109. Id. at 849.
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the persons involved in the event, to major, where the actions of one person
were attributed to the other.110
Suggestions outside of the formal interview context, just like those within,
take a variety of forms.  Suggestions can come from parents, from other chil-
dren, and even from within children themselves, and can range from completely
false, nonexperienced events to distortions of experienced events.  Very little is
known about suggestions outside the interview setting because of a myriad of
practical and ethical difficulties in studying them.  One issue that has received
no research attention is the effect of suggesting to a child that a real event never
happened.  Such a suggestion could be quite different from threats not to dis-
close experienced events or encouragement to keep actual events secret, be-
cause in both of the latter cases the events themselves are not denied.  Although
researching all types of outside-interview suggestions is difficult, suggestions in-
volving denials of true events could prove especially problematic from an ethi-
cal standpoint.
D. It Is Difficult to Identify Particular Children Most Susceptible to Suggestion
In studies such as that by Leichtman and Ceci,111 where a sizable minority or,
in some cases, a majority of children are led to allege events that did not occur,
researchers and practitioners alike have been divided on the meaning and prac-
tical implications of the results.112  Should we focus on the substantial proportion
of children who succumbed to suggestive influences or on those who somehow
stood their ground and resisted the repeated and combined forces of various
kinds of suggestions from an authoritative adult?  Which type better represents
the average child?  Is there any way to predict whether any individual child wit-
ness fits into one category or the other?
In an effort to answer these questions, scores of studies have been con-
ducted over the past decade to investigate relations between suggestibility and
various cognitive, personality, and social measures, as well as bio-psycho-social
factors such as gender and ethnicity. 113  Some of the many social and personality
factors examined in relation to suggestibility in recent studies include: compli-
ance, dependence, self-esteem, temperament—specifically inhibition and
adaptability—and parents’ and children’s attachment styles—categories of par-
ent-child relationship security.114  Some connections between cognitive factors
and susceptibility to suggestion seem fairly obvious, including intelligence,
memory ability, event-relevant knowledge levels, and source-monitoring abil-
110. Id.
111. Leichtman & Ceci, supra note 87.
112. Id. at 569.
113. Many of these studies have been summarized in two recent reviews of the research into indi-
vidual differences in children’s suggestibility.  Maggie Bruck et al., External and Internal Sources of
Variation in the Creation of False Reports in Children, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289,
305-10 (1997); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’ Suggestibility and
False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359, 363-74 (1997).
114. Bruck et al., supra note 113, at 308-10; Quas et al., supra note 113, at 369-72.
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ity.115  Children who cannot source-monitor well may not be able to keep track
of which pieces of information came from their own experience of the original
event and which came from external sources.116  Children with greater event-
relevant knowledge, on the other hand, may show increased or decreased sug-
gestibility relative to children who possess less event-relevant knowledge.117  Al-
though they may remember more accurate information, children who know
more about the theme of an event may infer information that was not pre-
sented.118
Despite, or perhaps because of, the ever-growing list of factors associated
with susceptibility to suggestion, there are several major problems for those
who hope to develop diagnostic tests of an individual child witness’s suggesti-
bility.  First, the single best predictor of suggestibility in children remains their
chronological age.119  Age is a better predictor because it encompasses develop-
ment in so many relevant areas, such as increased moral maturity, increased
memory monitoring ability, and decreased social compliance with authority.
Second, the research on individual differences in children’s suggestibility is re-
plete with inconsistent and often weak findings.120  For example, intelligence is
sometimes related to suggestibility, and other times not.121  Finally, there are dif-
ferent forms of suggestion,122 and a child’s performance on even a single type of
suggestibility task varies as a result.123  In other words, not only is it difficult to
predict a child’s suggestibility from a measure of cognitive ability or personality,
it is also difficult to predict that child’s performance on one suggestibility meas-
ure from another suggestibility measure.
Expanding on this latter point, Johann Endres points out that suggestibility
in one context may not relate to suggestibility in others because suggestibility is
a multidimensional construct and varies depending on memory strength for that
specific content, type of suggestion, and the like. 124  Thus, even a very suggesti-
ble child may be able to resist certain misleading questions.  Likewise, the fact
that a child yields to any given misleading question does not allow inferences
about his performance on other questions.
In one recent study by Michael Brady and colleagues, this lack of predict-
ability from one question to another was empirically demonstrated. 125  Children
115. Bruck et al., supra note 113, at 305-08; Quas et al., supra note 113, at 365-66.
116. Quas et al., supra note 113, at 365-66.
117. Id. at 367-68.
118. Lindberg, Interactive, supra note 7, at 54.
119. Lane Geddie et al., Child Characteristics Which Impact Accuracy of Recall and Suggestibility in
Preschoolers: Is Age the Best Predictor?, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223,  230-31 (2000).
120. Quas et al., supra note 113, at 359-60.
121. Bruck et al., supra note 113, at 305.
122. See discussion supra Section Part II.
123. Johann Endres, The Suggestibility of the Child Witness: The Role of Individual Differences and
Their Assessment, 1 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 44, 52 (1997).
124. Id.
125. Michael S. Brady et al., Young Children’s Responses to Yes-No Questions: Patterns and Prob-
lems, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 47, 54-55 (1999).
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between the ages of three and seven years were shown a videotaped event.126
Afterwards, they were asked several yes or no questions about the video and
then two “suggestibility check” questions unrelated to the videotaped event, in-
cluding one regarding the name of the interviewer’s dog.127  Children’s perform-
ances on these suggestibility check questions had absolutely no relationship to
their actual performance on target event questions.128
Research on individual differences has revealed numerous variables that
may affect children’s susceptibility to suggestion.  The practical implications of
these findings remain unclear.  The optimistic position, as described by Jodi
Quas and her colleagues, is that identification of the individual difference fac-
tors that predict suggestibility may eventually allow legal professionals to take
special precautions when interviewing children who are at the greatest risk of
incorporating suggestions into their reports. 129  But individual difference re-
search cannot now, and perhaps never should be, used “retrospectively to indi-
cate whether a particular child’s report is or is not true, or as a litmus test to de-
termine whether a given child is even suitable to be a witness.”130
E. It Is Difficult to Train Children to Resist Potentially Suggestive Questions
or to “Gate-Out” Previously Suggested Information
Given the previously documented difficulties in identifying children who are
especially susceptible to suggestive questioning, one of the next logical steps is
to teach all children to resist suggestions that they may encounter in the future
or to separate prior suggestions from original memories of experienced events.
A good deal of research has been dedicated to inducing resistance to suggestion
in children,131 but less attention has been paid to undoing the damage of sugges-
tions already provided.132
One of the earliest studies in which researchers attempted to buffer children
against suggestive questioning presented a story to seven-year-olds, twelve-
year-olds, and college students, and asked them to recall it. 133  Half of the par-
ticipants were then told that they were about to be asked questions, some of
which were potentially difficult or tricky, and that they should “only answer
126. Id. at 50.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 54.
129. Quas et al., supra note 113, at 382.
130. Id.
131. Johann Endres et al., Repetitions, Warnings and Video: Cognitive and Motivational Components
in Preschool Children’s Suggestibility, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 129, 129-46 (1999); Su-
san Gee et al., “What Color is Your Pet Dinosaur?”: The Impact of Pre-interviewing Training and
Question Type on Children’s Answers, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 111 (1999); Amye R.
Warren et al., Inducing Resistance to Suggestibility in Children, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273 (1991)
[hereinafter Warren, Resistance].
132. Karen J. Saywitz & Susan Moan-Hardie, Reducing the Potential for Distortion of Childhood
Memories, 3 CONSCIOUS & COGNITION 245, 245-66 (1994).
133. Warren, Inducing Resistance, supra note 131, at 276-79.
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with what they really remembered.”134  This warning was equally effective in re-
ducing suggestibility across the age range, but the reduction, in comparison to
the control group, was small at approximately five percent.135
Other recent studies have utilized warnings or preinterview training to re-
duce children’s suggestibility.136  In one study, a story was presented to four-
through seven-year-old children. 137  The story was followed by free recall and
then, for half of the children, by an explicit warning about tricky questions.138
This warning included a specific example of a question to which the children
could not know the answer because the information was not provided in the
story, along with the correct answer—”I don’t know.”139  This explicit warning
reduced the children’s suggestibility by about twelve percent.140
Somewhat older children were shown to profit from pre-interview training
in a series of two studies.141  In the first, children between the ages of nine and
thirteen went on a school field trip to an interactive science center.142  Approxi-
mately a week later, children were interviewed about the trip, and some of the
interview questions were misleading.143  Before conducting the interviews, half
of the children were trained to resist suggestive questions.144  The training in-
cluded instructions not to guess or make up answers, to respond “I don’t know”
or to correct the interviewer’s mistakes when appropriate, and practice with
several misleading questions and feedback on answers.145  Pre-interview training
reduced suggestibility by thirteen percent.  It also, however, reduced correct an-
swers to nonleading questions by increasing “don’t know” responses.146  A sec-
ond study was conducted in which the pre-interview training was revised to em-
phasize and practice providing correct answers when known. 147  The revision
appeared to be successful in reducing suggestibility by eighteen percent without
reducing correct answers for the nine- to eleven-year-olds who were trained
prior to the interviews.148
The most successful training program for reducing suggestibility was devel-
oped by Karen Saywitz and Susan Moan-Hardie.149  Seven-year-old children
134. Id. at 278.
135. Id. at 280, 282-83.
136. Endres et al., supra note 131, at 134; Gee et al., supra note 131, at 115.
137. Endres et al., supra note 131, at 133-35.
138. Id. at 133-34.
139. Id. at 134.
140. Id. at 135.
141. Gee et al., supra note 131, at 123-24.
142. Id. at 115.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 115-16.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 117-20.
147. Id. at 120.
148. Id. at 122.
149. Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, supra note 132.
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witnessed an event in their classrooms.150  Two weeks later, half of the children
were given extensive “resistance” training, whereas the remaining children were
encouraged to try hard and to do their best.151  The resistance training involved
several components above and beyond those used in the training study de-
scribed earlier.152  For example, children were engaged in discussions about rea-
sons a child might go along with an adult interviewer’s false suggestion and
were taught new response strategies such as stopping and thinking before an-
swering.  Other response strategies included using self-statements153 to promote
confidence in their own memories and to suppress inappropriate responses.154
They also practiced their new skills by watching a video and being interviewed
about it afterwards; feedback was provided for their responses to each ques-
tion.155  A review session was conducted the following day, prior to the target in-
terview.156  The reduction in suggestibility due to training, compared to the con-
trol group, was twenty-six percent.157  Unfortunately, as in the prior study, there
was a corresponding reduction in correct responses to correctly leading ques-
tions.158  Thus, a second study was conducted with revised training procedures,
placing less emphasis on “don’t know” responses and providing more practice
and reinforcement in reporting the correct answer when known. 159  The revised
training package resulted in a significant reduction in suggestibility without de-
creasing accuracy on correctly leading questions.160
Despite these encouraging results, it would be premature to declare pre-
interview training a panacea for the problem of children’s suggestibility for sev-
eral reasons.  First, none of these training packages has been attempted, let
alone succeeded, in children younger than seven years old, the age group that
presents the biggest challenge.161  Second, although suggestibility was reduced, it
was by no means eliminated.162  Third, these training packages must be carefully
devised in order to ensure their effectiveness in reducing suggestibility without
also decreasing accurate and complete reporting to nonleading questions.163  It
remains to be determined whether it would be possible or feasible for practitio-
ners to conduct these kinds of extensive and carefully crafted training interven-
tions prior to investigative interviews.  Finally, these sorts of interventions have
150. Id. at 414-16.
151. Id. at 415.
152. Id.
153. Examples of self-statements include: “I know it did not happen like that,” “I remember it a dif-
ferent way,” and “I should say what I remember.”  Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 416-18.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Gee et al., supra note 131, at 115, 121; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, supra note 132, at 251, 255.
162. Gee et al., supra note 131, at 125; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, supra note 132, at 258.
163. Gee et al., supra note 131, at 125; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, supra note 132, at 258.
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been designed to inoculate children against future suggestions, but children may
have already encountered suggestions prior to their first formal forensic inter-
view.164  Thus, recent studies have begun to investigate the possibility of helping
children to separate experienced from suggested information.165
One such study was reported by Debra Poole and Stephen Lindsay.166  In a
follow-up to their Mr. Science study,167 children experienced an event and were
later given misinformation about it from a book their parents read to them. 168
Prior to a final interview, children were trained to “source-monitor,” that is, to
separate what they had experienced (personal experience source) from what
they had only heard about (other source).169  This training was successful with
six- to eight-year-old children, in that they now correctly attributed some of the
false information they had previously reported to the book they had heard
rather than personal experience.170  However, there was no evidence that the
training was effective in reducing reports of nonexperienced events in three- to
five-year-olds.171
A different technique for reducing the effects of previously suggested false
information was studied by Mary Lyn Huffman and colleagues.172  Children be-
tween the ages of four and six years participated in an event at their preschools
with a visitor named Sam Stone and were interviewed a week later.173  Some of
the interview questions involved nonexperienced events whereas others em-
bedded misleading or correctly leading information about actually experienced
events.174  Two days following this interview, children were reinterviewed with
specific but nonleading questions.175  These final interviews began in one of
three different ways.176  One-third of the children were first asked three ques-
tions about the difference between truth and lying.177  Another third were asked
164. Poole & Lindsay, Eyewitness, supra note 74, at 27.
165. Brett K. Hayes & Katrina Delamothe, Cognitive Interview Procedures and Suggestibility in
Children’s Recall, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 562 (1997); Mary Lyn Huffman et al., Discussing Truth and
Lies in Interviews Children: Whether, Why, and How?, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 6 (1999);
Amina Memon et al., Reducing Suggestibility in Child Witness Interviews, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 503 (1996); Susan M. Larson, Truth/Lie Discussions and Preschoolers’ Memories of Person-
ally Experienced Events (1999) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga)
(on file with the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Library); Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lind-
say, Counteracting the Effects of Contamination on Children’s Eyewitness Reports, Eliciting Accurate
Testimony from Children: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why?, A Symposium presented at the Bi-
ennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Amye R. Warren & Debra A.
Poole, Chairs (April 1999) [hereinafter Poole & Lindsay, Effects].
166. Poole & Lindsay, Effects, supra note 165.
167. Poole & Lindsay, Eyewitness, supra note 74.
168. Poole & Lindsay, Effects, supra note 165, at 1.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Huffman et al., supra note 165, at 8.
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 12.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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many more elaborate questions about truth and lying and were asked to judge
three vignettes about other children telling the truth or lying.178  The final group
of children did not discuss truth or lying before the questioning began.179  All
children were asked to tell the truth about Sam Stone’s visit.180  Children who
had been asked the lengthiest series of questions about truth and lying were
significantly more accurate in their responses to the final neutral interview than
were the other two groups of children.181  A follow-up study by one of the re-
searchers, however, failed to replicate this effect. 182
Another method for reducing contamination from prior suggestions was in-
vestigated by two research groups with different outcomes.183  In both studies,
either the Cognitive Interview184 or a standard interview was conducted after
exposure to misleading questions. 185  In one study, eight- to nine-year-old chil-
dren witnessed a videotaped event and were then asked misleading questions.186
Next, they were reinterviewed with either the cognitive or standard interview,
and then another set of misleading questions was administered.187  Relative to a
standard interview, the cognitive interview increased accuracy and decreased
false answers to subsequent misleading questions.188  However, one-third of all
children reported false information even in free recall, and suggestibility ap-
peared to increase with the second set of misleading questions.189  Thus, the cog-
nitive interview did not reduce suggestibility in any absolute way, but only rela-
tive to the standard interview.190  In a second study examining the potential of
the cognitive interview for reducing children’s suggestibility, five- to seven-year-
old and nine- to eleven-year-old children were first exposed to a videotaped
event and then to misleading information about it, followed three days later by
either the cognitive or standard interview.191  The cognitive interview did not
prove to be superior to a standard interview in terms of children’s tendency to
intrude suggested answers in free recall and answers to direct questions. 192
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 13.
182. Larson, supra note 165.
183. Hayes & Delmothe, supra note 165, at 564, 568-71; Memon, supra note 165, at 507-08, 510-13.
184. RONALD P. FISHER & R. EDWARD GEISELMAN, MEMORY ENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW 41, 100, 110-11(1992).  The Cognitive
Interview was designed, based on findings from memory research, to enhance the completeness and
accuracy of eyewitness accounts.  The Cognitive Interview includes special mnemonic techniques and
instructions to report everything the witness remembers.  Id.
185. Hayes & Delmothe, supra note 165, at 565-67; Memon, supra note 165, at 508-09.
186. Memon, supra note 165, at 508-09.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 510.
189. Id. at 511-13.
190. Id. at 510-13.
191. Hayes & Delmothe, supra note 165, at 565-67.
192. Id. at 568-70.
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Finally, Michelle Leichtman and Stephen Ceci “challenged” children who
had reported suggested information with “Did you really see that or just hear
about it?” and a countersuggestion, “You didn’t really see him do that, did
you?” 193  In their most suggestive condition involving repeated misleading ques-
tioning plus the induction of a negative stereotype, initially seventy-two percent
of the children responded falsely to a direct question about Sam Stone’s be-
havior.194  With the first challenge, this rate dropped to forty-four percent, and
with the countersuggestion it fell further, to twenty-one percent.195  Thus, these
challenges were effective in eliminating two-thirds of the false allegations.196
A growing literature is documenting a variety of techniques to reduce the
impact of suggestions once they have already occurred.  These research efforts
are in their infancy, however, and the successes appear inconsistent across
studies and age groups.  Moreover, as with the techniques designed to increase
resistance to suggestions before they occur, these techniques do not eliminate
suggestibility, and they may be impractical or unethical for use in the field.  For
example, if a child reported that someone had inserted a stick into her vagina, it
would be completely inappropriate and probably counterproductive to obtain-
ing any further truthful disclosures to say, “That didn’t really happen, did it?”
F. It Is Difficult to Train Interviewers to Avoid Suggestive Techniques and to
Use Techniques Designed to Promote Accuracy
Given the difficulties of identifying particularly suggestible children and of
training children to resist suggestive influences, it is important for interviewers
to avoid the use of suggestive techniques.  Although this seems obvious, the in-
terviewers studied in many different countries tend to over-use closed-ended,
specific, and potentially leading questions and other “risky” practices.197  For ex-
ample, one study examined seventy-two interviews conducted by experienced
interviewers in Sweden. 198  Despite universal recommendations to begin inter-
views with general, open-ended or “invitational” questions that promote fairly
spontaneous, narrative responses, thirty-five of these interviews (forty-nine per-
cent) began with a suggestive question.199  Throughout the interviews, the inter-
viewers relied on suggestive and “option-posing” (forced-choice) questions,
which accounted for fifty-three percent of the interviewers’ utterances, and
elicited fifty-seven percent of the information from children.200  Similarly, fifty-
three percent of the utterances of a comparison sample of United States inter-
viewers and thirty-five percent of Israeli interviewers’ utterances were sugges-
193. Leichtman & Ceci, supra note 87, at 571.
194. Id. at 573.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Ann-Christin Cederbog et al., Investigative Interviews of Child Witnesses in Sweden, 24 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1355 (2000).
198. Id. at 1356-57.
199. Id. at 1358-59.
200. Id. at 1359.
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tive or option-posing.201  Only six percent of the Swedish interviewers’ utter-
ances were invitational.202  Corresponding figures for Israeli and United States
interviewers were similar, at two percent and five percent, indicating remark-
able consistency across cultures with different interview selection and training
procedures.203
Other studies of United States interviewers have documented similar prob-
lems.  An analysis of forty-two United States sexual abuse interviews found that
general, open-ended questions account for ten percent or fewer of all inter-
viewer questions, and that specific, yes-or-no-format questions account for two-
thirds of all questions. 204  In addition, interviewers sometimes (twenty-nine per-
cent of the time) completely fail to establish rapport and often (seventy-one
percent of the time) fail to establish interview ground rules by telling children
that they should feel free to correct the interviewers and to answer that they do
not remember or do not understand questions.205
Can interviewers’ performance be improved such that they reduce their reli-
ance on risky techniques and increase their use of recommended techniques?
Several recent training evaluation programs suggest that this is more difficult
than it seems.206
Jan Aldridge and Sandra Cameron examined the effectiveness of a week-
long intensive interviewer training program in the United Kingdom. 207  No dif-
ferences between trained and untrained interviewers were observed in terms of
their use of open, specific, and leading questions.208  Moreover, there were very
few requests for free reports, such as invitational, in either group, and over half
of the questions in both groups were specific and leading.209
In a similar evaluation study, the effectiveness of a ten-day interviewer
training institute was examined by comparing pre- to post-training videotaped
interviews with children about previously experienced staged events. 210  Analy-
ses of the use of open-ended, specific, and leading and misleading questions in-
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Warren et al., Sounds, supra note 59, at 236-37.
205. Id. at 233-34.
206. Jan Aldridge & Sandra Cameron, Interviewing Child Witnesses: Questioning Techniques and
the Role of Training, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 136 (1999); Graham M. Davies et al., The Im-
pact of Questioning Style on the Content of Investigative Interviews with Suspected Child Sexual Abuse
Victims, 6 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 81 (2000); Yael Orbach et al., Assessing the Value of Structured Pro-
tocols for Forensic Interviews of Alleged Child Abuse Victims, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 733
(2000); Amye R. Warren et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of a Training Program for Interviewing Child
Witnesses, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 128 (1999) [hereinafter Warren et al., Effectiveness];
HOME OFFICE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, MEMORANDUM OF GOOD
PRACTICE ON VIDEO RECORDED INTERVIEWS WITH CHILD WITNESSES FOR CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS (1992).
207. Aldridge & Cameron, supra note 206, at 138.
208. Id. at 142.
209. Id.
210. Warren et al., Effectiveness, supra note 206, at 129-30.
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dicated no significant changes due to training.211  On a more encouraging note,
interviewers were significantly more likely to establish the ground rules in the
interviews they conducted after training (forty-five percent) than before train-
ing (five percent).212  Additionally, interviewers’ knowledge of the relevant sci-
entific literature increased due to training, even though their new knowledge
did not appear to translate directly into new interview practices.213
In England, Graham Davies, Helen Westcott, and Noreen Horan assessed
interviews conducted by interviewers trained in techniques outlined by the
Memorandum of Good Practice. 214  Thirty-six interviews were examined, most
of which had been conducted in the mid- to late 1990s, during which time
training was more widely available than before.215  Despite the fact that all of the
interviewers had been trained in Memorandum-recommended practices, only
two percent of their questions were open-ended.216  Again, some encouraging re-
sults were found as well, in that only three percent of these interviewers’ utter-
ances were classified as leading.217
The most encouraging findings to date on interviewer training effectiveness
were reported by Yael Orbach and her associates.218  Their training program dif-
fered in many critical ways from those evaluated in the studies discussed previ-
ously.219  First, they trained interviewers to use a very structured protocol, simi-
lar to a “script.”220  Thus, rather than being encouraged to use open-ended
questioning, interviewers were given sample open-ended questions to ask and
the order in which they should be posed.221  Second, the initial intensive training
was followed with monthly individual sessions and group discussions that
included utterance-by-utterance reviews of videotaped interviews.222  Interviews
conducted by trained interviewers using the protocol were compared to non-
protocol interviews conducted previously by the same interviewers.223  The
protocol interviews were significantly improved in terms of the percentage of
open-ended prompts, as well as how long interviewers waited before asking
their first potentially suggestive (option-posing) question.224  Protocol interviews
also yielded more information from open-ended prompts and less from more
specific, focused questions than did non-protocol interviews.225  There were,
211. Id. at 132-33.
212. Id. at 133.
213. Id. at 132.
214. Davies et al., supra note 206, at 85.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 86.
217. Id.
218. Orbach et al., supra note 206, at 737.
219. Id. at 737-40.
220. Id. at 739.
221. Id. at 738-39.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 737.
224. Id. at 741.
225. Id. at 741-43.
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however, no differences between protocol and non-protocol interviews in terms
of the total amount of abuse-relevant information elicited.226
Extant research thus demonstrates that interviewer training is effective in
reducing problematic questioning techniques only when training is both
intensive and extensive, and only when it includes practice, individualized
feedback, and follow-up.227  Across the United States, interviewer guidelines
vary dramatically, and there is little documentation of current interview prac-
tices.228  Improving the quality of investigative interviews with children will,
therefore, require greater commitment of and cooperation between researchers
and practitioners, and far greater investments of effort and resources on the
part of the research and legal communities alike.
III
CONCLUSION
In this volume, many psycho-legal and legal scholars have attempted to cap-
ture and describe the state of our current knowledge of children’s testimony.
Certainly a great deal has been learned about children’s strengths, weaknesses,
and needs as legal witnesses.  This paper has instead focused on six topics about
which we know relatively little: suggestibility in older children, suggestions out-
side of leading questions and outside formal interview settings, individual dif-
ferences in suggestibility, and methods for reducing children’s susceptibility to
suggestive techniques and interviewers’ tendencies to use them.  If the growth
in understanding of children’s testimony over the last twenty years is any indica-
tion of the gains we will make over the next twenty, many of these six dilemmas
may soon be resolved.
226. Id. at 745-46.
227. Davies et al., supra note 206, at 93-94; Warren et al., Effectiveness, supra note 206, at 134-35.
228. Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough for Government Work: The Constitutional Duty to Preserve
Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (Winter 2002); Nancy E.
Walker, Forensic Interviews of Children: The Components of Scientific Validity and Legal Admissibility,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (Winter 2002).
